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Abstract
This contribution examines the problem of review of targeted sanctions imposed by the
Security Council in the light of recent developments occurring in the EU context. Some recent
judgments of the European Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) are
analysed, as rendered in the cases of Yusuf and Kadi and also in the more recent cases of the
Mujaheddeen and Sison. These last two judgments show that ﬂaws in the targeted sanctions
regimes exist not only at UN level. The CFI also does not substantively review the listingwhen
this listing is carried out by the Council of the EU. An examination of the progress made at
UN level to address procedural ﬂaws shows that, more than anything else, the real stumbling-
block is the lack of a substantive review of intelligence information by an independent and
impartial organ. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that we are on the way
towards a better de-listing procedure, but are not there yet.
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One of the red threads that run through John Dugard’s curriculum vitae and life
is the protection of the individual against arbitrary state behaviour. Generally, in-
ternational law and international institutions can be used to guarantee the basic
rights of the individual against such state behaviour. However, with international
institutions becoming more active, the need for protection of individuals against
international institutions themselves also increases. This ispreciselywhat is at stake
with theUNSecurityCouncil’s sanctions regimes targeting individuals and theneed
for individuals to be protected against possible arbitrary behaviour of the Security
Council. Anno 2007, the call for some form of procedural protection against the
Security Council has become particularly loud in the context of targeted sanctions.1
In a chapter on sanctions and judicial review in a book published in 2001, John
Dugard had already forecast that the demand for judicial review of Security Council
resolutions would only grow in the years to come.2 As indicated by Dugard, the
great increase in the number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council since
the end of the Cold War makes it more likely that the legality of certain of these
∗ Associate professor at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, Leiden University.
1. See, e.g., Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/88 (2007), at para. 31. And, much
earlier, I. Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human
Rights’, (2003) 72Nordic Journal of International Law 159.
2. J.Dugard, ‘JudicialReviewof Sanctions’, inV.Gowlland-Debbas (ed.),UnitedNations Sanctions and International
Law (2001), at 83. See also J. Dugard, ‘Judicial Review in Public International Law’, in E. J. H. Schrage (ed.)
Judicial Review (2002), at 35.
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resolutions will be disputed, which might in turn expose the need for some form
of judicial review. Moreover, Dugard observed that the perception of the Security
Council as being ‘governed and directed by an unrepresentative elite’ could also
encourage some states to fuel the debate on judicial review. Finally, Dugard referred
to the emergence of powerful non-governmental organizations (NGOs) acting as
public interest lawyers who might stir up requests to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) for judicial review.3
This contribution to the special issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law
dedicated to Professor John Dugard examines the latest developments relating to
the problem of review of targeted sanctions. First, in section 1, the concept of
targeted sanctions is examined. Subsequently, various recent judgmentsof theCourt
of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) are analysed in sections 2
and 3. In these judgments the European Court has exposed the procedural ﬂaws
of the targeted sanctions regimes. It has also shown that these do not only exist
at UN level. Interestingly, the European Court of First Instance also shies away
from substantively reviewing the listing when this listing is done by the Council
of the European Union rather than the Security Council’s sanctions committee. So
Security Council review may not be the only obstacle that must be overcome in
order to get a proper procedure in place. The progress made at UN level to address
the procedural ﬂaws is examined in section 4. Themain improvements concern the
listingprocedureandthe focalpointatwhich individualscan lodge their requests for
delisting.Butstill thereisnopossibilitywhatsoeverofsomeindependentsubstantive
review at UN level. Here again it becomes clear that, more than anything else, the
real stumbling block is the substantive review of intelligence information by an
independent and impartial organ. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this,
as is done in section 5, is thatwe are on theway towards a better delisting procedure,
but we are not there yet.
1. TARGETED SANCTIONS AND THE NEED FOR REVIEW
After the Cold War the Security Council entered uncharted waters on a number of
occasions. Most notably in the context of its sanctions policy, it opted for a more
rigorous approach after the Iraq experience in the early 1990s and developed the
conceptof targeted sanctions.4 Targeted sanctionswere considered tobemore effect-
ive and to undercut the negative consequences on the population of comprehensive
economic sanctions. Targeted sanctions can include travel bans, arms embargoes, or
ﬁnancial sanctions such as the freezing of assets. They do not aim to target the state
and its population, but they rather target selected persons or sectors of the economy.
This development is comparable with the emergence of ‘modern’ or vertical inter-
national criminal law in the 1990s, in that leading individuals are targeted directly
3. Dugard, ‘judicial Review of Sanctions’, at 83–4.
4. Iraq was not the only case in which comprehensive sanctions had a devastating impact on the population;
see R. Geiss, ‘Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension
Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-up Assessment of Long-Term Effects’, (2005) 18 Harvard Human
Rights Journal 167, at 167. See also M. Reisman, ‘Assessing the Lawfulness of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The
Case of Economic Sanctions’, (1995) 89American Society of International Law Proceedings 350, at 351.
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rather than through abstract state entities. However, sanctions policy and interna-
tional criminal lawdiffer in nature on anumber of points, such as, in principle, their
aims. Amore important difference for this discussion is thatwhereas criminal law is
a body of law that is by nature applied by a court operating on the basis of clear pro-
cedural rules, sanctions are imposed by the Security Council operating on the basis
of political decision-making. The modus operandi of the Security Council posed
particular problemswhen the Council – through its sanctions committees – started
to impose measures on individuals rather than on states without simultaneously
offering any recourse for individuals to complain about themeasures taken against
themor to be heard at somepoint. In addition to being a human rights problem, this
issue also has vast institutional connotations and it relates directly to questions of
checks and balances in the context of a system of collective security.
When imposing sanctions the Security Council generally also establishes a sanc-
tions committee with the task of monitoring and reporting on the sanctions. These
committees are also charged with the task of listing the individuals and corporate
entities that are to be subjected to the sanctions. The committees list individuals
and entities, based on proposals or information ofmember states. The problemhere
is that individuals are not heard at any time either before or after listing and, once
listed, individuals do not have a proper avenue to complain directly to the sanctions
committee about their listing and about the sanctions that are subsequently im-
posed. Individuals have no standing either before the Security Council or before the
sanctions committees.National courts are reluctant to serve as an alternative forum,
given Article 25 of the UN Charter, which obliges states, including national courts,
to ‘accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordancewith the
present Charter’. A national decision condemning the listing as violating speciﬁc
international law standards and ordering the state to act contrary to the sanctions
committee’s lists, risksundermining thewhole systemof collective security.The same
holds true for decisions of regional courts such as the CFI.
The problem of wrong listings and the apparent inability to be delisted arose,
but is not conﬁned to the context of targeted sanctions against the Taliban and al
Qaeda. Also in the context of other targeted sanctions regimes, claims of wrong
listings have been made. For instance, in several reports of the Panel of Experts on
Liberia, thePanelnoted that ithad receivedanumberof complaints fromindividuals
claiming to be improperly listed and thus unfairly subjected to the travel ban.5 The
complainants asserted that they were not guilty, that they lacked information as to
why theywere put on the list, and that the reports from the Panelwere not objective.
The complainants even threatened to sue the United Nations and the Panel.6 Yet
5. See, e.g., the Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, UN Doc. S/2002/470 (2002), at paras. 158–159 as
referred to by I. Cameron, Targeted Sanctions and Legal Safeguards, Report for the Swedish Government (2002),
at 7, n. 17 (available at http://www-hotel.uu.se/juri/arkiv/sanctions.pdf). These complaints concerned the
Liberia Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001). See also another Report of the
Panel of Experts on Liberia, UN Doc. S/2004/396 (2004), at para. 156, reporting that several individuals had
complained about their listing and had submitted that they no longer had any ties or contact with Charles
Taylor, the former Liberian leader. And see the Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, UNDoc. S/2004/955
(2004), at para. 171, for another claim of innocence. These latter complaints concerned the Liberia Sanctions
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003).
6. UN Doc. S/2005/745 (2005), at para. 157.
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legal avenues were only really explored in relation to the targeted sanctions against
membersof theTalibanandalQaeda.Thiscontributionwill focusonthesesanctions.
The sanctions were ﬁrst imposed in 1999 by Resolution 1267.7 This resolution
imposed a limited air embargo and a funds and ﬁnancial assets embargo on the
Taliban. Subsequently, Resolution 1333 imposed an air and arms embargo, restricted
travel sanctions onAfghanistan, and in this resolution the Security Council decided
that states had to freeze funds of Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and his
associates.8 Resolution 1390 enlarged the reach of the sanctions to any person asso-
ciated with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda.9 The special feature of the
Taliban/al-Qaeda sanctions is that ever since SecurityCouncil Resolution 1390 there
isno longer a territorial link toAfghanistan, and individualsof anynationality, resid-
inganywhereintheworld,havebeenlistedonarather largescale.10Alsoquiteanum-
ber of individuals residing in Europe orwith assets in European bank accounts have
been listedand their assets frozen. Someof these individualshave lodgedcomplaints
with European courts,most importantly the CFI. This has resulted in the judgments
of September 2005 in the cases of Yusuf and Kadi.11 Both appealed against the
judgments to the European Court of Justice.12 In the meantime Yusuf has been
removed from the list by the sanctions committee, but Kadi has not. The Yusuf
andKadi reasoning has been further elaborated in a July 2006 judgment in the cases
ofHassan and Ayadi.13 In total, nine challenges to the Taliban/al Qaeda listing have
been lodged before theCFI so far, and a further 16 claimshave beenmade at national
levels both in European and other states, such as the United States and Pakistan.14
2. YUSUF AND KADI AND THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS
The challenges of Yusuf, the organization Al Barakaat, and Kadi before the CFI
included amongst other grounds the claim that they had been wrongfully listed
7. UNDoc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
8. UN Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000).
9. UN Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002).
10. As noted by Cameron, supra note 5, at 7–8. The consolidated list, last updated on 9 July 2007, contained 142
individuals and one entity belonging to or associated with the Taliban, and 223 individuals and 124 entities
belonging to or associated with al Qaeda. So far, 9 individuals and 11 entities have been removed from the
list pursuant to a decision by the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. In comparison, the lists of the
Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan Sanctions Committees contain respectively 3, 23,
and 4 entries (lists last updated on 18 December 2006, 17 July 2007, 7 August 2007 respectively).
11. CFI,Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Case T 306/01; Yassin
Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, Case T 315/01, 21 September 2005.
12. ECJ, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council, Appeal against Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September
2005, Case C-402/05 P, 24 November 2005; ECJ, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and
Commission, Appeal against Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005, Case C-415/05 P,
1 December 2005.
13. CFI, Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case T-49/04,
Judgment, 12 July 2006; and Chaﬁq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European
Communities, Case T-253/02, Judgment, 12 July 2006.
14. The cases are described in the Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team
appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning al Qaeda and
the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; UN Doc. S/2007/132 (2007), Annex I.
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and that they did not have an effective means of challenging their listing.15 In ﬁrst
instance, the EuropeanCourt respected the special priority status of theUNCharter
and the binding resolutions of the Security Council taken under Chapter VII, and it
indicated that it had no authority to review whether Security Council resolutions
were consistent with fundamental rights.16 However, in a remarkable subsequent
move, the European Court empowered itself to checkwhether the Security Council
resolutions were consonant with norms of jus cogens, since, the Court said, these
rules have a higher status, are non-derogable, and are binding on all subjects of
international law, including the organs of the United Nations.17
As such, the reasoning that the Security Council should adhere to jus cogens is not
breathtaking. As stated by Judge ad hoc Sir Elihu Lauterpacht in the Application of
the Genocide Convention (Provisional Measures),
Theconceptof jus cogensoperates as aconcept superior tobothcustomary international
lawandtreaty.ThereliefwhichArticle103of theChartermaygive theSecurityCouncil
in case of conﬂict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligation
cannot – as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms – extend to a conﬂict between a
Security Council resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to state the opposite
proposition thus – that a Security Council resolution may even require participation
in genocide – for its unacceptability to be apparent.18
In his ﬁne jus cogens separate opinion, Judge ad hocDugard recalled Lauterpacht’s
suggestion that ‘a Security Council resolutionwill be void if it conﬂictswith a norm
of jus cogens’.19
On an earlier occasionDugard had noted that once it is accepted that the Security
Councilmust respect the rules of jus cogens, ‘it is a short step toﬁnding that theCourt
is theappropriatebody todeterminewhether theCouncilhasexceeded itspowers’.20
Obviously, the Court that Dugard was talking about was the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).Whether a regional court such as the CFI is also an appropriate court to
deal with this question is quite a different matter. The way in which the European
Court in theYusuf andKadi cases proceeded to determinewhether the human rights
invoked constituted jus cogens is in this author’s view not convincing, and adds to
the argument that national or regional courts are in fact not the proper place for
the review of Security Council measures, in addition to the argument that such a
review risks undermining the system of collective security. The problem is that, in
the context of targeted sanctions, the ICJ cannot play a role, given that individuals
15. Initially, two other individuals joined the challenges in the case of Yusuf, namely Adirisak Aden and Abdi
Abdulaziz Ali. However, these two individuals were struck off the list at the request of Sweden on 26 August
2002. See, in more detail, P. Crame´r, ‘Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted UN Sanctions: Erosion of
Trust in the Security Council’, in E. deWet andA.Nollkaemper (eds.),Review of the Security Council byMember
States (2003), at 85.
16. Kadi, supra note 11, at paras. 209–225; Yusuf, supra note 11, paras. 260–276.
17. Kadi, supra note 11, at paras. 226–232; Yusuf, supra note 11, at paras. 277–283.
18. Case Concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order of
13 September 1993 on the Request for the Indication of Further Provisional Measures, Separate Opinion of
Judge Lauterpacht, [1993] ICJ Rep., at para. 100. As cited by J. Dugard, ‘Judicial Review of Sanctions’, supra
note 2, at 86.
19. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda),
Judgment of 3 February 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep. 2006, at para. 8 (Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard).
20. J. Dugard, ‘Judicial Review of Sanctions’, supra note 2, at 86.
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are targeted and they have no standing before the ICJ. A general advisory opinion
may have some impact on improving the procedure in general, but will not help
individual persons who want to be delisted.
Therefore when the European Court was confronted with the petitions of Yusuf
and Kadi, it was clear that there was a great need for some procedural protection
for the individuals targeted by Security Council measures. Given the lack of any
established legal avenue at UN level, the European Court may have felt the need to
step in, albeit it to a very limited extent. Therefore, even though there is room for
criticism as to the precise legal reasoning of the Court, its judgment has placed the
need for procedural reform on the Security Council’s agenda and the Court can be
commended for doing so.
3. OTHER RELEVANT EUROPEAN PROCEEDINGS
Before evaluating the changes that have been made at UN level to address the
procedural ﬂaws highlighted by Yusuf and Kadi, it may be worthwhile to pay
attention to parallel proceedings before the CFI which also concerned terrorist
listing, most notably theMujaheddeen case21 and the Sison case.22
The claims in these cases were generally the same, namely improper listing and
no proper delisting procedure. Yet the legal framework differed, given that the Mu-
jaheddeen and Sison had not been listed pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1267, but pursuant to counterterrorism Resolution 1373. Like Resolution 1267, Res-
olution 1373 obliges states to take certainmeasures against individuals, such as the
freezing of assets.23 However, Resolution 1373 leaves it up to each state to draw up a
list of people against whom themeasures are to be directed, rather than a sanctions
committee undertaking this task. In the context of the European Union, the lists
were established by theCouncil of the EuropeanUnion. Personswere to be included
on the list on the basis of
precise information or material in the relevant ﬁle which indicates that a decision
has been taken by a competent authority in respect of persons, groups and entities
concerned, irrespective of whether it concerns the instigation of investigations or
prosecution for a terrorist act, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate
such an act based on serious and credible evidence or clues, or condemnation for such
deeds.24
According to theEUCommonPosition, the list has to be reviewed at least once every
six months.25
Since the actual listingwas not done at UN level, the complaints about improper
listingdidnot immediatelytouchuponthesensitive issueofSecurityCouncil review
21. CFI,Organisation desModjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council of the EuropeanUnion (hereafterMujaheddin), Case
T-228/02, Judgment, 12 December 2006.
22. CFI, Jose Maria Sison v. Council of the European Union, Case T-47/03, Judgement, 11 July 2007.
23. UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
24. Council CommonPosition of 27December 2001 on the applicationof speciﬁcmeasures to combat terrorism,
2001/931/CFSP, L 344/93, Art. 4.
25. Ibid., Art. 6.
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and therefore left more room for the CFI to condemn the listing.26 And so it did. In
the Mujaheddeen case, in which judgment was rendered on 12 December 2006, the
CFI annulled thedecision toplace theMujaheddeenorganizationon the list because
the Council of the European Union had not provided sufﬁcient reasons for listing
the organization and because the decision to list had been adopted in the course of
a procedure during which the Mujaheddeen’s right to a fair hearing had not been
observed.27 Subsequently, on 11 July 2007, the decision listing the Dutch resident of
Philippine nationality, Sison, was equally annulled.28
In both judgments the CFI indicated that pursuant to settled case law and fun-
damental principles of community law, an individual who is directly and adversely
affected by a communitymeasure has the right to be notiﬁed of the evidence on the
basis of which the measures against him are taken, either concomitantly or soon
after themeasuresare taken, and that there is anobligationonthepartof theCouncil
to state reasons.29 More speciﬁcally, an individual or entity must be made aware of
the speciﬁc national decision on the basis of which he is listed.30
So, in both cases, the Council decision was annulled as a consequence of proced-
ural ﬂaws. Yet, in both cases, the CFI did not undertake a substantive review of the
decision – that is, a review of whether it was correct that the applicants had been
listed or of whether there was in fact no sufﬁcient basis for placing them on the
list.31 The Council subsequently improved its procedure in line with requirements
as set out by the Court. Both applicants – Mujaheddeen and Sison – have now been
listed on the basis of the improved procedure.32 The CFI judgments clearly exposed
the procedural ﬂaws in the decision-making process, and they send a message as
to what is expected in this process. However, the most difﬁcult issue relating to a
substantive review of the decision taken was left untouched, even at EU level.
4. THE SECURITY COUNCIL IMPLEMENTS PROCEDURAL CHANGES
The European judgments, the reports commissioned by governments and inter-
national organizations,33 and the numerous observations of special rapporteurs and
26. TheECFI recognized the different legal framework, especially in the context of the right to a fair hearing. The
Court indicated that, in the Yusuf and Kadi context, there was no discretion whatsoever for the Community
institutions to alter the lists of the Security Council. Given that delisting could only be done at UN level,
it was not necessary that the right to be heard would be exercised before the European institutions, as this
could not lead to delisting in any case.Mujaheddeen, supra note 21, at para. 100 and further, Sison, supra note
22, at para. 147 and further.
27. Mujaheddeen, supra note 21, at para. 173.
28. Sison, supra note 22 at paras. 224–226.
29. Mujaheddeen, supra note 21, at paras. 93, 108, 109, 129.161–165; Sison, supra note 22, at paras. 161–198, 212,
226.
30. Mujaheddeen, supra note 21, at paras. 166–174; Sison, supra note 22, at paras. 184, 212, 213.
31. Sison, supra note 22, at para. 226: ‘The Court is not, even at this stage of the procedure, in a position to
undertake the judicial review of the lawfulness of that decision in light of the other pleas in law, grounds
of challenge and substantive arguments invoked in support of the application for annulment.’ See similarly
Mujaheddeen, supra note 21, at para. 173.
32. On the latest list, of 28 June 2007, the name of the Mujaheddeen organization reappears. Council Decision
of 28 June 2007, L169/58.
33. There are threemain reports: (i) the report prepared by I. Cameron commissioned by the Council of Europe,
The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security Council Counter-terrorism
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scholars regarding the inadequacy of the listing and delisting procedure clearly
exposed the need for change. This was even recorded in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome.34 In addition, certain states showed increasing hesitation in co-operating
with the al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee and submitting new names for
listing, precisely because of the procedural ﬂaws.35 Hence, based on legal and prag-
matic considerations, a number of procedural changes have been made since the
sanctions were ﬁrst imposed in 2001. Some of the most important are outlined
below.
4.1. Resolution 1617 concerning al-Qaeda and the Taliban
Initially, in the context of Resolution 1267, which ﬁrst imposed the sanctions on the
Taliban, the Sanctions Committee did not have clear criteria on the basis of which
individuals were put on the list, so that the listing procedure was rather lacking in
transparency, to put itmildly. On the basis of Resolution 1390, any person associated
with Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or the Taliban could be subjected to sanctions.36
In this resolution the Security Council did call upon the Sanctions Committee
to ‘promulgate expeditiously guidelines and criteria’ necessary to implement the
measures.37 In Resolution 1526 of 30 January 2005, the Security Council called upon
states to provide information demonstrating to the greatest extent possible a link
betweenan individual or entity andOsamabinLaden, al-Qaeda, or theTalibanwhen
submitting a new name for listing. However, it was only in Resolution 1617, issued
in2005, that theSecurityCouncil gave clearer criteria as towhat the term ‘associated
with’ meant, namely that it included acts such as
– participating in the ﬁnancing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of
acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in
support of;
– supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to;
– recruiting for; or
– otherwise supporting acts or activities of
Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, afﬁliate, splinter group or
derivative thereof.38
Sanctions, 6 February 2006, (ii) the report of Bardo Fassbender commissionedby theUNOfﬁce of LegalAffairs,
Targeted Sanctions and Due Process, 20March 2006, and (iii) theWhite Paper prepared by theWatson Institute
commissioned by the Governments of Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions
through Fair and Clear Procedures, UN Doc. A/60/887 – S/2006/331 (2006).
34. UN Doc. A/60/1 (2005), at para. 109.
35. Sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to Security
Council Resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning al Qaeda and the Taliban and associated
individuals and entities, UN Doc. S/2007/132, 8 March 2007, para. 16.
36. UN Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002), at para. 2.
37. UN Doc. S/RES/1390, (2002), at para. 5(d).
38. UN Doc. S/RES/1617 (2005), at para. 2.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S TARGETED SANCTIONS REGIMES 805
Not only were these criteria given at a very late stage and after many individuals
and entities had already been listed, they also still leave considerable discretion,
arguably toomuch.
4.2. Two resolutions of December 2006
With the threat of adverse national and regional judgments hanging over it and
pursuant to recommendations of the Monitoring Team, the Security Council, on
the proposal of France and the United States, decided to establish a focal point
within the UN Secretariat which individuals can directly petition for delisting.39
From a formal point of view such a focal point undeniably facilitates access for the
individual, since before this resolution an individual was dependent on his state of
nationality or residence to lodge a petition for delisting on his behalf. However, it
remains to be seen what the implications are in practice and whether an individual
who has no backing whatsoever from a state has any chance at all of success in a
political delistingprocedurebefore a subsidiaryorganof theSecurityCouncilwhere
decisions are made on the basis of consensus.
Finally, Resolution 1735, adopted as recently as December 2006, aimed at further
streamlining the listing and delisting procedure. For example, it was stressed that a
stateproposal for listingshould includeastatementofcasewithspeciﬁc information
supporting a determination that an individual or organization meet the criteria of
Resolution1617.Theproposing state should indicate thenatureof the information–
ascomingfromintelligenceservicesor fromothersources–andsupportingevidence
should be provided if possible.40 The state should also specify which parts of the
statementofcasecanbemadepublic forthepurposeofnotifyingthelistedindividual
or entity.41 Furthermore, Resolution 1735 included a procedure for notiﬁcation of
listed individuals and entities through the Secretariat and member states.42 As
to delisting, the resolution explicitly stated that change of behaviour can lead to
delisting.43
5. REMAINING CONCERNS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In all, it appears that much has been done to improve the listing procedure. This
is important, as adequate listing reduces to some extent the need for a delisting
procedure. However, that the Sanctions Committee started listing persons as early
as 2001without having in place clear criteria for the listing, andwithout any proper
procedure for delisting, is quite a considerable error. Currently, listing criteria have
been formulated and requirements have been put in place as to the statement of
case and notiﬁcation. However, there is still the need to have a proper delisting
procedure. So themost pressing question remains: what kind of delisting procedure
is required?
39. UNDoc. S/RES/1730, (2006), at para. 1.
40. UN Doc. S/RES/1735, (2006), at para. 5.
41. Ibid., at para. 6.
42. Ibid., at para. 10.
43. Ibid., at para. 14.
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There are two human rights setting procedural standards that may be relevant
to answering this question, namely the right to a fair trial and the right to an
effective remedy. Which particular right applies depends on how the sanctions are
characterized, either as being administrative, civil, or criminal in nature. The right
to a fair trial is only applicable to criminal or civil cases and not to administrative
cases. A further consequence of the characterization issue concerns the standard of
evidenceusedfor listing.So far the1267Committeehasnotexplicitly indicatedwhat
standard of evidence it applies. In general, characterizing the sanctions as criminal
sanctions would mean that the high standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ applies,
whereas characterization of the sanctions as administrative measures would entail
a lower standard, such as the ‘balance of probabilities’ standard.
In its guidelines the 1267 Sanctions Committee characterizes the sanctions as
being administrative in nature.44 In addition, the Monitoring Group established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1526 (2004) has also consistently held that
the sanctions are ‘designed to prevent terrorist acts, rather than provide a compen-
diumofconvictedcriminals’, and that the sanctionscannotbecharacterizedasbeing
criminal in nature. TheMonitoring Group stated, in this respect, ‘after all, the sanc-
tions do not impose a criminal punishment or procedure, such as detention, arrest
or extradition, but instead apply administrative measures such as freezing assets,
prohibiting international travelandprecludingarmssales’.45 TheECFIendorsed this
qualiﬁcation.46 In contrast, a number of scholars as well as special rapporteurs have
pointed out that the issue may not be so clear-cut.47 They refer to jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights which has laid down criteria for an ‘autonom-
ous characterization’. The ‘ofﬁcial’ characterization is only one of these criteria. In
addition, other criteria, such as the nature and severity of the sanctions, play a role.
Given the link to a criminal offence – terrorism – the listing pursuant to Resolution
1267 bears a criminal-law connotation.48 Moreover, based on the profound impact
that long-term freezing of assets has on an individual’s life, it may also be argued
that sanctions should in fact be characterized as being a criminal law measure. On
the other hand, the aim of the sanctions is not punitive and change of behaviour
may result in delisting, as is now explicitly stated in Resolution 1735 (2006).
Regardlessof theacademicdiscussionofthenatureof thesanctions, it is important
to note that the right to an effective remedy is relevant in any event. Even if it is
argued that the Security Council cannot be bound by human rights in precisely the
same manner as are states, the core of the right to an effective remedy is a general
44. See, e.g., the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of itsWork, adopted on 7November 2002 and last
amendedon12February2007, at para. 6: ‘A criminal charge isnotnecessary for inclusionon theConsolidated
List as the sanctions are intended to be preventive in nature’.
45. UN Doc. S/2005/572 (2005), at paras. 39–44, in particular para. 39: ‘The List is not a criminal list. Rather
it contains the names of those who have engaged in or supported al-Qaeda or Taliban terrorism in some
tangible way, regardless of whether any authority has formally charged themwith a criminal offence’.
46. See, e.g., Sison, supra note 22, at 101 and 129.
47. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 33, at 10; Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/61/267, (2006), at para. 35; and A. Bianchi, ‘Security Council’s Anti-terror
Resolutions and their Implementation by Member States’, (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice
1044, at 1066.
48. White Paper, supra note 33, at 16.
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and fundamental principle of the international order that the Security Council
cannot just ignore.49 The key elements of the right to an effective remedy require
that a decision be substantively reviewed by an organ (i) that has a minimum level
of independence and impartiality, (ii) which is accessible to the individual, and
(iii) which has the power to indicate measures.50
With these requirements at hand, one may seriously question whether the
changes that have been made so far to the delisting procedure are sufﬁcient. Even
though individuals now have direct access through the focal point, there still is no
body with any level of independence to assess an application for review. On this
point theremust be further reform. A judicial court is not the only option for sound
review, but there must be a body or a person with some level of independence and
impartiality that can substantively review petitions for delisting. It is about striking
the right balance, which is obviously very complicated. Even the European Court
of First Instance does not review substantively listings done by the Council of the
EuropeanUnion, let alonebyaSecurityCouncil sanctions committee.TheEuropean
Court conﬁned its review to the procedural aspects relating to the obligation to state
reasons and the right to fair hearing.
In proposing solutions for reform, security considerations and the wish of states
not to publicize all their intelligence informationmust be taken into account. Yet it
is the state thatmust prove in the ﬁrst instance that state security issues are at stake;
this burden should not and cannot be placed on listed individuals. As observed by
the CFI in the Mujaheddeen judgment, the general principle of the observance of
the right to a fair hearing applies ‘unless precluded by overriding considerations
concerning the security of the Community or its Member States’.51 And it was also
pointed out by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights while countering terrorism that ‘the onus [of demonstrating that access to
information must be restricted on the basis of concerns of national security] must
be on the State or the institution/body refusing access to justify any limitations on
access to the information used’.52
Hence security concerns cannot obstruct further reform altogether, but further
reform should take into account the need to accommodate security concerns. Yet,
in the end, if the Security Council or member states want no scrutiny whatsoever,
then maybe the consequence should be that they cannot have the tool of targeted
sanctions at their disposal at all. If one directly targets an individual, there must be
away for that individual substantively to challenge themeasure taken against him;
there must be an effective remedy. This is what protection of the individual is also
about.
49. Bianchi gives a brief overview of theories on the basis of which it can be held that the UN, including
the Security Council, must respect fundamental human rights: Bianchi, supra note 47, at 1061–3. See also
Fassbender, supra note 33.
50. See also the statement of UN Legal Counsel Michel in the Security Council debate on strengthening inter-
national law, in which the issue of improving the targeted sanctions procedures was a main issue; UN Doc.
S/PV.5474 (2006), at 5.
51. Mujaheddeen, supra note 21, at para. 137.
52. Protection of Human Rights, supra note 47, at para. 38.
